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European Islamaphobia and Turkey - Refah
Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2003, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
reviewed a decision by Turkey's highest court, the Constitutional Court,
dissolving one of the largest political parties in Turkey, Refah Partisi
("Refah").' The ECHR found that the dissolution of Refah Partisi did
not violate Article 11 of the European Human Rights Convention
("Convention").2
This Note will analyze the ECHR's decision to uphold the dissolu-
tion of Refah despite a history of overturning similar cases, and con-
clude that the Refah decision was incorrect. Part II will provide a brief
introduction to Refah and the history of the dissolution of political par-
ties and secularism in Turkey. Part III will provide a synopsis of the
ECHR's decision in Refah. Part IV will demonstrate the way in which
the ECHR's decision did not remain faithful to the values outlined in the
Convention. Specifically, it will discuss how the ECHR's decisions
failed to support the democratic process in Turkey. It will explain that
the true impetus for the ECHR's decision was European concern about
the rising popularity of Islam in Turkey and the increased infiltration of
Islamic values into the Turkish political process. As a potential member
of the European Union (EU) and a largely Islamic country sitting at the
doorstep of mainland Europe, Turkey is a country of great interest to the
European Community.3 An increased Islamic socio-political influence
has created concern that a fundamentalist form of Islamic politics will
soon take root in Turkey, just as such politics took root under similar
circumstances in Iran.4 Part V will conclude with a summary of the ar-
1. Refah Partisi v. Turkey, (Eur. Ct. H.R., Feb. 13, 2003), at http://www.echr.coe.int.
2. Id. I 13b.
3. Turkey is the EU's sixth largest trading partner and crossroads between Europe and the
Middle East. Christopher Frank, Turkey's Admittance to the European Union: A Keystone Be-
nveen Continents, 11 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 66, 66-67 (Summer 2002).
4. Susana Dokupil, The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modern
Turkey, 105 W. VA. L. REv. 53, 106 (2002).
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gument, and a discussion of how the Refah decision may affect the cur-
rent controlling party in Turkey.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Rise and Fall of Refah Partisi
In 1983, Necmettin Erbakan, the former Turkish Prime Minister,
formed Refah.5 Refah's members ran on a platform based on Islamic
fundamental values.6 In the 1989 local elections, Refah received about
10 percent of the votes and won mayoral elections in five large cities.
7
By 1995, Refah had grown dramatically in power. The party won
twenty-four mayoral seats, a plurality of the public's vote, and the larg-
est number of seats in Turkey's Parliamentary Assembly. 8 That same
year, Erbakan became the first Islamic Prime Minister in Turkey in over
eighty years.9 As Prime Minister, Erbakan sought to improve ties with
Libya and Iran.' Erbakan further made statements praising Sudan, Iran,
and Islamic groups like Hamas for resisting Western power, causing
concern to Turkey's Western allies."
Refah's popularity increased rapidly due to several factors, includ-
ing the people's growing dissatisfaction with Turkey's secular parties
and those parties' pro-Western ideologies. 12 The Turkish people, in gen-
eral, were dissatisfied with the West's perceived failure to protect Mus-
lims in Bosnia and to support Turkey's bid to the European Union.
13
This dissatisfaction with the West was exacerbated by the United Na-
tions embargo against Iraq, an embargo that devastated the economy of
eastern Turkey.' 4 In addition to a rising sense of Turkish dissatisfaction,
Refah's success could also be attributed to the increasing popularity of
Islam in Turkey.' 5 Refah's political platform focused on issues of social
justice, government corruption, widespread poverty in Turkey, and
5. Refah Partisi, 10, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
6. Id. 27.
7. Id. 11.
8. Dokupil, supra note 4, at 105.
9. Id. at 109.
10. Id. at 113.
11. Ugur Akinci, US Press Sees Erbakan's Rise "a Milestone," TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Jul.
1, 1996, available at http://www.turkishdailynews.com/oldeditions/07-01-96/ for.htm.
12. Dokupil, supra note 4, at 106.
13. Id. at 106.
14. Id.
15. HEINz KRAMER, A CHANGING TURKEY: THE CHALLENGE TO EUROPE AND THE UNITED
STATES 78-79 (The Brookings Inst. 2000).
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whether a Turkish government, established under the precepts of Is-
lamic values, could cure the many woes suffered by the populace.'
6
In June 1997, Refah began to unravel as Erbakan resigned under
pressure from the military.' 7 Later that year, the Attorney General
brought Refah before the Turkish Constitutional Court on charges of
anti-secularism for attempting to introduce Islamic law.'8 In January
1998, the Constitutional Court abolished Refah based on violations of
secularism. 1
9
B. History of Dissolution of Political Parties in Turkey
Refah's dissolution was not an isolated incident. Turkey has a long
history of repressing groups and individuals that might present a threat
to the stability of the state or the concept of secularism. For example,
from 1923 to 1996, the Turkish courts dissolved or banned thirty-eight
political parties.20 The basis for dissolving political parties lies in the
Turkish constitution itself. Article 14 states that "none of the rights and
freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim
of .. .establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, or creat-
ing discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect",.
21
Under Article 68, a political party whose aim is to support and to set up
the domination of a class or group, or any kind of dictatorship, cannot
be formed.22 Finally, under Article 69, "[t]he dissolution of political par-
ties shall be decided by the Constitutional Court after the filing of a suit
by the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Republic."
23
The Constitutional Court has used its power frequently and effec-
tively to remove political parties with contrarian views. For example, in
1993, the Constitutional Court dissolved the People's Labour Part
(HEP), a Kurdish party supporting the creation of Kurdish provinces in
Turkey, because its activities were likely to "undermine the territorial
integrity of the State and unity of the nation.",24 Also, the Constitutional
Court dissolved the United Communist Party of Turkey for similar rea-
16. Id. at 79.
17. Dokupil,supra note 4, at 119-20.
18. Herve Couturier, Turkey's Islamic Party Facing Probable Ban, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Nov. 12, 1997, available at 1997 WL 13432556.
19. Talip Kucukcan, State, Islam, and Religious Liberty in Modern Turkey: Reconfiguration
of Religion in the Public Sphere, BYU L. Rev. 475, 497 (2003).
20. Edip Yuksel, Cannibal Democracies, Theocratic Secularism: The Turkish Version, 7
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 423, 444-445 (1999).
21. TURK. CONST. pt. II, ch. I, art. 14.
22. TURK. CONST. pt. II, ch. IV, art. 68.
23. TuRK. CONST. pt. II, ch. IV, art. 69.
24. Yazar v. Turkey, 2002-1I Eur. Ct. H.R. 397, 402.
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sons, in addition to the use of the word "Communist" in the party's
name. 25 Although these cases involved dissolution of parties advocating
Kurdish autonomy, most of the Constitutional Court's dissolution activ-
ity has been focused on Islamic-based political parties.
26
Refah is not the first Islamic party to have its fate determined by
the Constitutional Court. Erbakan started a political party, Mill Nizam
Partisi, in 1970.27 One year later, the Constitutional Court dissolved the
party because it used "religion for political purposes in violation of Tur-
key's fundamental constitutional provisions requiring secularism." 28 Er-
bakan created another political party two years later, Milli Selamet Par-
tisi (National Salvation Party); however, that party too was dissolved in
1980.29 Later that year, hoping the third time would be the charm, Er-
bakan created Refah. While Refah had greater success than Erbakan's
first two endeavors into the political realm, Refah ultimately faced the
same fate as its predecessors. The Constitutional Court banned the
party, finding that Refah had become a "centre of activities contrary to
the principle of secularism."
30
C. Secularism in Modern Turkey
Before turning to Refah's case before the ECHR, it is helpful to
understand the principle of secularism in Turkey and the reasons why it
was established. The secular movement in Turkey was inspired by
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the first president of the post-Ottoman Empire
Turkey.31 Ataturk's goal was to minimize the role of Islam and to pro-
mote more modem, Western values. 32 Secularism sought to reduce the
importance of Islam that was pervasive in every aspect of Turkish soci-
ety during Ottoman rule.33 The government under Ataturk implemented
the secular agenda by utilizing new Turkish symbols, banning religious
institutions that were closely tied to the government, and eliminating
Sharia law in order to adopt the use of Western legal codes to firmly es-
tablish secularism within the Turkish Constitution.34
25. United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 25-26.
26. See Frank, supra note 3, at 68.
27. Kucukcan, supra note 19, at 491.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 492.
30. Refah Partisi, 39, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
31. Kucukcan, supra note 19, at 485.
32. TURKEY: A COUNTRY STUDY 36 (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1995).
33. Kucukcan, supra note 19, at 486.
34. Id. at 486-88. Sharia law is the law governing Islamic society.
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Ataturk's three-prong process of secularization was quite intensive.
By changing the everyday symbols used by the Turkish people, the
government sought to reduce the impact of Islam on the national iden-
tity.35 For example, the new secular government changed the Turkish
alphabet from Arabic to Latin script.36 It also switched to a Gregorian
calendar used by Western countries.37 The government encouraged and
accepted Western clothes and Western styles.
Ataturk took note of United States constitutional mores and care-
fully divided religious institutions from governmental institutions. One
of his first steps as president was abolishing the caliphate.39 That same
year, Ataturk dissolved the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 40 By banning
the involvement of religious institutions in government, Ataturk sought
"to completely free the polity from religious considerations."s
4'
Finally, by eliminating the use of Sharia law in the personal affairs
of Muslims, Ataturk and his secular followers further reduced the influ-
ence of Islam in the community.42 The new codes, modeled after the
codes of the West, were promulgated to minimize the role of Islam in
Turkey.
The Turkish government's belief in secularism is so strong that it is
set out in the Preamble of its Constitution:
[N]o protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish
national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence
of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral
values or the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of
Atatfirk and.. as required by the principle of secularism, there shall
be no interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state
affairs and politics.
43
Secularism is further emphasized in Article 2 of the Constitution,
which states that "The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and
35. STANFORD J. SHAW & EZEL KURAL SHAw, HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND
MODERN TURKEY 386 (1977).
36. Binnaz Toprak, Politicisation of Islam in a Secular State: the National Salvation Party
in Turkey, in FROM NATIONALISM TO REVOLUTIONARY ISLAM 119, 120 (1984).
37. SHAW & SHAW, supra note 35, at 385.
38. Id. at 386.
39. The Ottoman caliphate was considered to be the primary caliphate in the Islamic world
until it was abolished by the National Assembly (at Atatfirk's request) in 1924. See ANDREW
MANGO, ATATIGRK: THE BIOGRAPHY OF THE FOUNDER OF MODERN TURKEY 404 (1999); NEAL
ROBINSON, ISLAM: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 45 (1999).
40. Kucukcan, supra note 19, at 487.
41. Metin Heper, Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective, 35
MIDDLE E. J. 345, 350 (1981).
42. Kucukcan, supra note 19, at 488.
43. TURK. CONST. pmbl (emphasis added).
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social state governed by the rule of law." 44 Finally, the Constitution
makes Article 2 unamendable.45
III. REFAH PARTISI V. TURKEY PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Turkey's dissolution of Refah was done under the pretense of secu-
larism. The Constitutional Court found that Refah's pro-Islamic rhetoric
put the principles of secularism at risk.46 The Court held that the rheto-
ric encouraged Turkish women to wear headscarves in public and in
educational establishments, 47 the implementation of multiple legal sys-
tems based on religious affiliation, 4 and the establishment of a theo-
cratic regime, whether peacefully or by force.49 After its dissolution,
Refah appealed its case to the ECHR, stating that the dissolution vio-
lated Article 11 of the Convention. 50
A. The European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and Turkey
In 1950, the Council of Europe established the Convention. 51 Sig-
natories to the Convention are required to recognize the Convention's
principles, but not required to enact them as domestic law.52 The Con-
vention established the ECHR in 1958 as part of its adjudication struc-
ture.53 Turkey, in its continuing bid to become part of the European Un-
ion, signed the Convention in 1954. 54
Since the establishment of the ECHR, Turkey has often been
forced to defend its actions. Since the ECHR's inception, it has handed
down over forty verdicts against Turkey.55 This is largely attributable to
Turkey's abysmal track record in the human rights arena. In addition to
numerous political party dissolution cases, the ECHR has ruled against
Turkey on issues involving the "imprisonment of people for their non-
44. TURK. CONST. pt. I, ch. II, art. 2.
45. TURK. CONST. pt. 1, ch. IV, art. 4.
46. Refah Partisi, 40, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
47. Id. 27.
48. Id. 2.
49. Id. 40.
50. Id. 14.
51. Euro Know, Euro Know: European Convention on Human Rights, at http://www.euro-
know.org/dictionary/e.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2004).
52. Id.
53. Signatory countries to the Convention ratified Protocol II in October 1997. MARK
JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 65 (1995).
54. European Court of Human Rights, Dates of Entry Into Force, at
http://www.echr.coe.intIEng/EDocs/DatesOfRatifications.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
55. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003: Europe and Central Asia: Turkey, available
at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/europel3.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
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violent opinions or after unfair trials, as well as unlawful killings and
arbitrary house destruction by the Turkish security forces.56
B. Article 11 and Applicability to Refah
Article 11 of the Convention states:
1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to
join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise
of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of
the administration of the State.57
Essentially, Article 11 allows people to assemble freely and asso-
ciate peacefully. The ECHR has unwaveringly affirmed the principle
that Article 11 applies to political parties.5 8 States may legally limit Ar-
ticle 11 if it is necessary to maintain public safety, to maintain national
security, to prevent crime, or to protect other freedoms.59 The ECHR
has emphasized, however, that "the exceptions set out in Article 11 are,
where political parties are concerned, to be construed strictly; only con-
vincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on such parties'
freedom of association. ', 60 Therefore, a government seeking to dissolve
a political party cannot easily reach the threshold necessary to surmount
Article 11 protections of association.
Moreover, European Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1308
further underscores the high threshold necessary to overcome Article 11
protection when it states "restrictions on or dissolution of political par-
ties should be regarded as exceptional measures to be applied only in
cases where the party concerned uses violence or threatens civil peace
56. Id.
57. European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art.
11,213 U.N.T.S. 221, 232.
58. E.g., United Communist Party of Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1; Yazar, 2002-11 Eur.
Ct. H.R. at 397; Socialist Party v. Turkey, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51 (1999).
59. European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 57, art.
11,213 U.N.T.S at 232.
60. United Communist Party of Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 46.
2004]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
and the democratic constitutional order of the country."' Thus, the dis-
solution of a political party is a drastic measure that should only be un-
dertaken in the most dire circumstances.
Due to the high threshold necessary to overcome the freedom of
association protections of Article 11, most party dissolution cases result
in favorable rulings for the parties.62 However, Refah is unique because
the ECHR determined that the Constitutional Court's decision did not
violate Article 1 1.63 The ECHR found that Turkey met the threshold es-
tablished in United Communist Party v. Turkey to limit the general free-
dom of association rights outlined in Part One of Article 11.64
C. Refah's Case is not Distinguishable from Prior Article 11 Political
Party Dissolution Cases
Although Refah's case had few differences from past cases brought
before the ECHR, its outcome was antipodal to the outcomes of such
predecessors. Before looking at Refah's case in detail, it is important to
review some past dissolution cases brought before the ECHR against
Turkey, including United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey and Ya-
zar v. Turkey.65 The ECHR's rulings in these two cases will demonstrate
how it diverged from its prior precedent in Refah Partisi.
According to United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, the
United Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP) was established as a politi-
cal party in June 1990.66 Ten days after its creation, the Principal State
Counsel brought an action in the Constitutional Court to dissolve the
TBKP. 67 The Constitutional Court banned the TBKP based upon the
party's alleged encouragement of Kurdish separation and the use of
"Communist" in its title. The ECHR held that the exceptions set out in
Article 11(2) had to be construed strictly in relation to political parties.68
Turkey's dissolution of the TBKP did not meet the exceptions because
61. Resolution 1308 (2002): Restrictions on political parties in the Council of Europe mem-
ber states, 11, Eur. Parl. Ass., 2002 Sess. (Nov. 18, 2002), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA02/ERES 1308.htm.
62. Since 1998, the ECHR has reviewed five party dissolution cases. In four of the five
cases, the ECHR found an Article 11 violation. See Refah Partisi, at http://www.echrcoe.int;
Yazar, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 397; Socialist Party v. Turkey, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51 (1999); 6zdep
v. Turkey, 1999-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 295; United Communist Party of Turkey, 1998-1 Eur. Ct. H.R.
1.
63. Refah Partisi, 136, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
64. Id. 87.
65. Yazar, 2002-1I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 402; United Communist Party of Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct.
H.R..
66. United Communist Party of Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 7.
67. Id. at 7-8.
68. Id. at 22.
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(1) a political party's choice of name could not justify dissolution and
(2) the TBKP sought to resolve the Kurdish issue through dialogue.
69
Even though the TBKP advocated the "peaceful, democratic and
fair solution of the Kurdish problem," and despite the government's con-
tention that this would lead to discrimination based on race in addition
to a national security risk, the ECHR found that the dissolution of the
TBKP was unfounded under the Convention. 70 The ECHR based its de-
cision on the fact that the TBKP's "programme" (constitution) did not
advocate for special treatment for the Kurds or propose that the TBKP
achieve its political agenda through violence. 7'
In Yazar v. Turkey, the Turkish government dissolved the People's
Labour Party (HEP) two years after its creation, stating that the HEP's
activities were "likely to undermine the territorial integrity of the State
and the unity of the nation. 7 2 Turkey based its decision on the fact that
the HEP advocated the formation of Kurdish provinces in violation of
the Turkish Constitution prohibiting racial discrimination.73 HEP also
claimed that terrorist acts by a Kurdish separatist group---which HEP
considered to be freedom fighters-were acts of international war, and
advocated for self-determination for the Kurds.74
The ECHR found against Turkey, stating that HEP had not under-
mined Turkish democracy and had not advocated policies to that end.75
The ECHR further stated that HEP's goals should be introduced into
public debate in order to "find solutions to problems of general inter-
est.
7 6
D. The Court's Decision in Refah
In Refah, the ECHR applied its standard Article 11 analysis to de-
termine whether Refah's dissolution violated the Convention. First, the
ECHR inquired whether there was an interference with Refah's freedom
to associate.77 Second, the ECHR determined whether the inference, if
any, was justified.78 To be justified, the interference had to be pre-
69. Id. at 26-27.
70. Id. at 26.
71. Id.
72. Yazar, 2002-1I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 402.
73. Id. at 402.
74. Id. at 401-02.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 414.
77. Refah Partisi, 50, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
78. Id. 51.
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scribed by law, serve a legitimate aim, and be necessary in a democratic
society.79
In most dissolution cases, there is little argument surrounding
whether there was interference. The process of dissolution, by its very
nature, is interference. Most of the controversy centers on whether or
not the interference was justified.
To justify the interference, Turkey had to satisfy three elements.
First, Turkish law must prescribe the interference. Second, the interfer-
ence must serve a legitimate aim. Finally, the interference must be nec-
essary to protect the democratic principles of society.8 °
Here, the ECHR found that Turkish law warranted the interfer-
ence. 81 Article 69 of the Constitution gives sole discretion to the Turkish
Constitutional Court on the question of dissolution.82 In addition, Arti-
cle 69 prohibits political parties from engaging in activities contrary to
Article 68, such as those activities that discriminate against race, relig-
ion, language or sect.83 The Constitution also charges the Turkish Con-
stitutional Court with protecting secularism in the state.84
Interestingly, the ECHR also gave weight to the identities of Re-
fah's leaders and their prior legislative experience in determining
whether the interference was prescribed by law.85 In doing so, the
ECHR implied that Refah's leaders could have foreseen the risk of dis-
solution and later assumed that risk, because many of its leaders were
members of the Turkish parliament involved in discussions about
amending the Constitution. 86 Apparently, the lawfully prescribed inter-
ference was reinforced because Refah's leaders were knowledgeable of
the law and Turkey's amended Constitution.
After a notably brief analysis, the ECHR determined whether Tur-
key's interference served a legitimate aim. In its decision, the ECHR
concluded that Turkey's dissolution of Refah pursued "several legiti-
mate aims listed in Article 11 [of the Constitution]" including "protec-
tion of national security and public safety, prevention of disorder or
crime and protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
87
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 22.
82. TURK. CONST. pt. III, ch. IV, art. 69.
83. Id.
84. TURK. CONST. pt. III, ch. IV, art. 68.
85. Refah Partisi, 62, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
86. Id. 63.
87. Id. 67.
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Next, the ECHR discussed in detail whether the interference was
necessary in a democratic society and determined that Turkey had a le-
gitimate necessity to dissolve Refah. The ECHR specifically focused on
Refah's proposals seeking to implement a plurality of legal systems
based on religious affiliation, its support for Sharia-based law and its
failure to promptly disassociate itself from members who expressed the
need for jihad ("holy war") to gain political power.88 Based on these fac-
tors, the ECHR felt that Turkey needed to protect the individual free-
doms outlined in the Convention.89
Furthermore, the ECHR held that a political party's means to
achieve change must be legal and democratic. 90 Accordingly, the ECHR
held that Refah's proposed changes failed to comport with fundamental
democratic principles, and due to Refah's success in general elections,
there was a likelihood it could implement those changes through the
democratic process. 91
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ECHR's DECISION
A. The ECHR's Break with Precedent
In making its decision, the ECHR did not rely on its past precedent
and analysis. This break with precedent included: failing to use Refah's
constitution for a basis of its decision, giving weight to Refah's actions
while it was the controlling party in the Turkish Parliament, placing too
great an emphasis on party extremists, and creating additional require-
ments before finding an Article 11 violation.
92
First, the ECHR abandoned its precedent of examining a party's
constitution in order to determine whether there was a legitimate excep-
tion to Article 11 (1).93 If the ECHR had examined Refah's constitution,
it would have found that Refah did not advocate the establishment of
either Sharia or Islamic law as a fixture of Turkish society.94 Also, the
ECHR would have found that Refah's constitution did not substantiate
the Turkish government's contentions about the threat Refah posed to
88. Id. 116-34.
89. See id. 133.
90. Id. 98.
91. Id. 1108.
92. See United Communist Party of Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 26; Refah Partisi, 115,
at http://www.echr.coe.int.
93. United Communist Party of Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 26.
94. The examples cited by the ECHR dealt with speeches given by Erbakan in 1993. Er-
bakan had proposed allowing Turkish citizens to choose a legal system based on their religious
beliefs. See Refah Partisi, 72, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
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Turkey's democratic principles. 95 Instead, the Refah constitution pro-
posed granting Turkish citizens the right to send their children to Is-
lamic middle schools, allowing women to wear headscarves at schools
and public universities and allowing people with Islamic beliefs to re-
main in the military.
96
Even if Refah's proposals were inconsistent with the ideals of secu-
larism espoused in the Turkish Constitution, the ECHR should not be
the judge of secularism. Rather, the ECHR's role under Article 11 of the
Convention is to ensure that people have the freedom to associate and
publicly debate their ideas. In the Refah decision, however, the ECHR
reduced the import of the party's constitution to controversial comments
made by Refah's members.97 Every political group has a faction with
extremist views, and the ECHR improperly relied on the views of a few
radical members to "speak for" the views of an entire party.9" Refah did
not advocate the abandonment or the drastic amendment of the Turkish
Constitution.99 Although Erbakan was a proponent of Islamic values, he
always upheld the principles of democracy and secularism within the
Constitutional parameters as Prime Minister.
100
Furthermore, Refah was a large, established party in Turkey with a
track record of supporting democratic principles and the Turkish Consti-
tution.'01 Refah had existed for thirteen years prior to its dissolution and
was the most powerful party in Turkey during the one year Erbakan
served as Prime Minister of Turkey. 10 2 Again, during this time, Refah
did not take any measures that were contrary to democratic princi-
ples.'0 3 Specifically, Refah never introduced legislation to implement
Islamic law.' 
04
Additionally, the ECHR added two hurdles into its analysis on Re-
fah's appeal that were not required of other parties in dissolution cases:
likelihood of success and assumption of risk.10 5 In the TBKP and HEP
decisions, the ECHR did not look at whether these parties would be
successful in achieving their goals because this element was not part of
an Article 11 analysis. Had the ECHR done so, it would have found that
95. Id. T8 1.
96. Yuksel, supra note 20, at 445-46.
97. Refah Partisi, 116, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
98. See id. 100.
99. Id. 76.
100. See id. 83.
101. See id. 70.
102. Id. 69.
103. Id. 76.
104. See id. 70.
105. Id. 61.
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both TBKP and HEP were relatively new parties. 0 6 Thus, although their
goals were, in part, to seek an independent Kurdish state, the reality that
they would succeed was minimal at best.
This element of likelihood of success was instrumental in the
ECHR's decision to uphold the dissolution of Refah, justified as a
"pressing social need".10 7 The Court stated "If Refah had proposed a
programme contrary to democratic principles, its monopoly of political
power would have enabled it to establish the model of society envisaged
in that programme."'1 8 An extension of the ECHR's analysis would lead
to the inference that any political party, with a monopoly of control,
should be dissolved because its monopoly posed a threat to Turkey's
democratic principles. However, the ECHR does not extend this same
logic in other party dissolution cases.
The second hurdle the ECHR added for Refah was an assumption
that its leaders knew the risk associated with their conduct. The Court
held that its leaders were experienced politicians. 10 9 Erbakan, who was a
member of Parliament and Prime Minister, had knowledge that Refah's
anti-secular platform and activities could cause its dissolution.110 In de-
termining whether the dissolution was prescribed by law, the ECHR
used this assumption of knowledge by Refah's leaders as a basis for its
decision."' Although there was ample notice of support for dissolution
in Turkey's Constitution, this additional hurdle was not imposed by the
ECHR on other political parties where the dissolution was found to vio-
late the Convention.
112
TBKP and HEP advocated for drastic change in Turkish society.
In their constitutions, both sought to achieve these social changes
through non-violent means."13 Refah's situation only differs in two re-
spects. First, Refah was a political party whose proposed changes to so-
ciety were based on the precepts of Islam. Second, at one point in its
brief history, Refah became the most powerful political party in Turkey.
The combination of these two items swayed the ECHR's decision to-
ward dissolution. Fundamentally, however, there were few differences
between Refah, TBKP, and HEP. The changes impliedly proposed by
Refah to Turkey's political system were no more incompatible with fun-
106. TKBP was an official party for ten days. HEP was an official party for two years.
107. Refah Partisi, 106, at http://www.echr.coe.int.
108. Id.
109. See id. 62.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Seeid. 99.
113. Id. 132.
2004]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
damental democratic principles than those sought by other political par-
ties.
B. An Islamic Turkey as a Barrier to Entry into the European Union
The next question that logically arises is why the ECHR decided to
uphold the dissolution of Refah. Refah's Islamic base coupled with its
growing popularity in Turkey was likely a driving force in the ECHR's
decision." 4 The decision implicitly expressed the fears that Europeans
have about an Islamic country potentially becoming a member of the
European Union.
The Court observed that forecasts estimated that Refah could ob-
tain 67 percent of the vote in the general election in 2001.15 With this
super-majority, the ECHR expressed the concern that "at the time of
dissolution, Refah had the real potential to seize political power without
being restricted by the compromises inherent in a coalition. If Refah had
proposed a programme contrary to democratic principles, its monopoly
of political power would have enabled it to establish the model of soci-
ety envisaged in that programme."' 16
The Court's concern that Refah could have fundamentally changed
the direction of Turkish politics is an ongoing concern shared through-
out the European Union. Europeans fear the possibility of a fundamental
Islamic state, not only on the border of Europe, but within the European
Union. Some believe that "Islam is so different from other religions that
a separation between religion and politics cannot be accepted" in a
country where the primary religion is Islam.' 17 Others feel political Is-
lam is dangerous because radical behavior often follows. 18 This belief
is underscored by the terrorist attacks by fundamentalist Islamic extrem-
ists on September 11, 2001.
Finally, another European sentiment is that Turkey's form of secu-
larization is driven by the military regime and not espoused by the gen-
eral populace. 119 In order for Turkey to become part of the European
Union, Islam in Turkey must become Europeanized to include recogni-
tion of "individual human rights, [formation of] a civil society, tolerance
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and cultural and religious pluralism."'' 20 Essentially, the ECHR empha-
sizes the feeling in Europe that acceptance of Turkey into the European
Union is conditioned upon Turkish politics conforming to European and
Western ideals.
The concern over popularity of a fundamental Islamic political re-
gime in addition to Turkey's abysmal human rights record and signifi-
cant poverty have led many prominent Europeans to believe Turkey and
the European Union are not a good fit.
12 1
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Refah Partisi v. Turkey was contrary to its
typical resolution to political party dissolution cases. Rather than focus-
ing the decision on Refah's constitution and acts by the party while it
was in power, the court relied instead upon statements and beliefs of
Refah's individual members. It also relied on the allegedly imminent po-
litical threat created by the rapid growth of the party. The Court's con-
clusion is a response to an overall European concern about a political
Islamic regime arising in Turkey. By upholding the Turkish Constitu-
tional Court's decision, the ECHR sought to eliminate this perceived
threat to the security of Europe.
Although Refah is no longer an active party in Turkey, political
parties with Islamic principles still tend to gain widespread support.
22
The current controlling party in Turkey's parliament, the Justice and
Development Party (AKP), traces its roots back to Refah and is led by a
former member of Refah, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 123 Even though AKP
has taken a more open stance toward integration into the EU, it is still
viewed with some concern by secularists as a watered-down version of
Refah.124 Given this tension, it is likely only a matter of time before
AKP faces a similar fate as Refah.
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